Abstract In many Third Wave democracies large classes of people experience diminished forms of citizenship. The systematic exclusion from mandated public goods and services significantly injures the citizenship and life chances of entire social groups. In democratic theory civil associations have a fundamental role to play in reversing this reality. One strand of theory, known as civic engagement, suggests that associations empower their members to engage in public politics, hold state officials to account, claim public services, and thereby improve the quality of democracy. Empirical demonstration of the argument is surprisingly rare, however, and limited to affluent democracies. In this article, we use original survey data for two large cities in Third Wave democracies-São Paulo and Mexico City-to explore this argument in a novel way. We focus on the extent to which participation in associations (or associationalism) increases "active citizenship"-the effort to negotiate directly with state agents access to goods and services legally mandated for public provision, such as healthcare, sanitation, and security-rather than civic engagement, which encompasses any voluntary and public spirited activity. We examine separately associationalism's impact on the quality of citizenship, a dimension that varies independently from the level of active citizenship, by assessing differences in the types of citizenship practices individuals use to obtain access to vital goods and services. To interpret the findings, and identify possible causal pathways, the paper moves back-and-forth between two major research traditions that are rarely brought into dialogue: civic engagement and comparative historical studies of democratization.
In many new Third Wave democracies, large classes of people experience diminished forms of citizenship. In Brazil, India, Mexico, and South Africa, for example, electoral democracy is robust but longstanding political exclusion, authoritarian political and social institutions, and clientelist networks result in particularistic and differentiated treatment by state agents.
1 As a result large social groups have unequal access to legally mandated goods such as healthcare, sanitation, and security (public goods, in short), injuring their citizenship and life chances. When seeking to obtain access to these goods, these citizens are systematically denied the right to petition the state, obtain public information, or appeal discriminatory administrative decisions.
Positive democratic theory is virtually unanimous in claiming that civil associations have a fundamental role to play in reversing this reality. Among the many strands of democracy theory-pluralism, civil society, historical institutionalism-one strand broadly known as civic engagement suggests that civil associations play this role by empowering individuals to engage in public politics, hold state officials to account, and claim public services.
2 Individuals who participate in associations become what we call "active citizens." Such active citizens, civic engagement studies argue, play a vital role in democratizing state institutions. Paradoxically this important and widely held idea has, with a few exceptions in affluent democracies, not been explored empirically in a systematic manner.
3 Studies of civic engagement, furthermore, tend to treat the positive role of associations as a covering law, rather than as a hypothesis to be explored in specific historical contexts.
This article examines the impact associational participation has on individual citizens' ability to make claims on public agencies in middle income democracies, and the terms on which these claims are made. The article focuses on active citizens' efforts to negotiate their access to vital public goods that agents of the state are legally mandated to provide, rather than on political struggles for new citizenship rights or entitlements. We use original data from a Citizen Survey of the general population conducted in 2002/03 in the large urban centers of two important new democracies-São Paulo, Brazil (n=1, 292) and Mexico City (Federal District) (n= 1,285). These two sub-national regimes have greater internal homogeneity as analytic units than their respective nation-states, and the data can therefore be explored in greater detail. The cities are critical cases for the new democracies, in that they share with many less affluent and newer democracies the legacies of authoritarian rule, diverse forms of political clientelism, and high degrees of socioeconomic inequality-all barriers to active citizenship. Yet they have features that make an associational impact on citizenship activity more likely: a strong government presence, highly competitive electoral politics, and well-developed associational spheres.
1 Cf. Holston 2007; O'Donnell 1993 O'Donnell , 2005 Méndez et al. 1999; Diamond and Morlino 2005; Harriss 2005; Jha et al. 2007; Armony 2007. 2 Cf. Almond and Verba 1963; Verba et al. 1978 Verba et al. , 1995 Putnam 1993 Putnam , 2000 Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Dalton 2006. 3 Survey-research in new democracies has also left this idea unexamined. Cf. Verba et al. 1978; Bratton et al. 2005; Krishna 2006; Booth and Seligson 2009; Durand Ponte 2004. We define active citizenship narrowly, as present when individuals negotiate the terms of their access to mandated public goods and services in ways that are publicly sanctioned and protected. It can take individual or collective forms. The concept has only a partial overlap with that of civic engagement, which is defined far more broadly and openly as any voluntary public activity and covers a wide range of activities that may or may not relate to the provisioning of public goods or services. Whereas citizenship activity is understood as being triggered by state failure, discriminatory action or inaction, and seeks fulfillment of existing individual and collective rights or entitlements, civic engagement is understood as voluntary and public spirited action that contributes to a broad public good. Definitions of civic engagement furthermore include centrally membership in associations or clubs, whereas active citizenship is categorically different from associational participation. Whether or not individuals rely on associational participation to help negotiate access to public goods and services are separate questions from whether they are active citizens. Active citizenship is therefore also distinct from political activism, which can lead individuals to join associations in order to influence the composition of mandated public goods and services, at a political level, through lobbying or advocacy activities.
While we test the hypothesis from the civic engagement literature that associations empower individual citizens, we examine separately two dimensions of active citizenship that survey research has tended to conflate: the level of citizen activity and the quality of that activity. The size of the active population, and sometimes its socio-demographic distribution, is generally used as a proxy for the quality of citizenship. However, how citizens are active, and the democratic quality of the types of activities they undertake, is distinct from the level and distribution of citizen activity. The well documented slippage between constitutional-legal regimes that define the status of citizenship and the citizenship practices that actually govern relations amongst citizens and between citizens and the state requires us to explore the democratic quality of those practices alongside the level of citizenship activity.
We develop an original typology of citizenship practices to capture variation in the quality of citizenship. Institutionalized petitioning most closely approximates the democratic ideal, under what O'Donnell (2005) calls the democratic rule of law. Informal brokerage through powerful third parties, contentious collective action targeting agents of the state (Tilly 1986 (Tilly , 2004 McAdam et al. 2001) , and collective self-provisioning of public goods and services government ought to provide, but has failed to or has done so poorly, are practices that diminish the quality of citizenship, injuring individuals' legal status as rights-bearing agents and violating the citizenship principles of universality and equality. Each of these practices can be undertaken with civil associations, but we find that this is not very common-most active citizens do not rely on associations to petition state agents, arrange informal brokerage, coordinate contentious collective action or organize collective selfprovisioning.
We find that participation in civil associations-what we also call "associationalism"-leads to higher levels, and wider breadth in socio-demographic terms, of active citizenship in the two urban centers. This finding significantly extends the empirical domain to which the generalizations, first developed in research on affluent democracies, apply. In contrast, associationalism does not improve the quality of citizenship practices. Among the ways of being active, people who participate in associational life are no more likely than the general population to engage in institutionalized petitioning of state agents, and are no less likely to engage in collective self-provision, contention, or brokerage. By identifying the lack of an impact on the quality of citizenship, this article demarcates narrower boundaries of the contribution associations make to democratization than research has to date.
Is there no associational impact on the quality of citizenship? Our data indicate we need to look beyond the impact associations have on individual citizens. One possibility, about which we speculate in the final section of the paper, is raised by a strand of theory different from civic engagement: comparative historical studies of democratization suggest that associations representing large classes of peoplelabor, women, racial/ethnic groups, and others-have historically played a central role in expanding the legal content of citizenship and state reforms that have contributed to more democratic citizenship practices. 4 The initial sections that follow conceptualize active citizenship, its associated practices, and associational participation, to provide a theoretical basis which allows for measurement using a survey instrument. Simple descriptive (and univariate) statistics then used provide an initial portrait of the relationship between associationalism and active citizenship. These are followed by multivariate models that identify the causal importance of associational participation for active citizenship. We validate the models in the "Appendix": our findings are made to withstand the possibilities of dual causality-the possibility that for some it is their active citizenship that leads them to participate in associations, rather than vice versa-or an omitted variable or third factor(s) that may drive both individuals' participation in associations and their citizenship activity (Heckman 1990) . Moving back-and-forth between the literature on civic engagement and comparative historical studies of democratization, the final sections explore some of the implications the findings have for democratic theory.
Citizenship in practice and the quality of democracy
Across diverse national contexts we find a substantial gap between constitutionallegal regimes that establish the formal status of citizenship and the citizenship that in practice governs individuals' relations to other citizens and agents of the state. 5 In both affluent and Third Wave democracies, the nature of the gap between the status and the reality of citizenship can vary considerably within nation-states, across social groupings, national territory, and legal dimensions of citizenship (Holston 2007; O'Donnell 1993; Somers 1993) . In the context of the Third Wave democracies that concern us here, it is often a majority of the population that has a quality of citizenship that is self-evidently inferior to that of powerful minorities.
This knowledge has triggered a new debate on the quality of Third Wave democracies that includes, alongside concern with the functioning of electoral and representative institutions, the problematic nature of the rule of law more broadly.
6 O'Donnell (1993 O'Donnell ( , 2005 and others observe that the accountability of public bureaucracies is often particularly weak and agents of the state systematically fail to treat citizens in a manner consistent with their legal status as rights carriers.
7 In middle-income democracies such as Brazil, India, Mexico, and South Africa, the greatest slippage between the status of citizenship and citizenship in practice is not in the exercise of political rights, but in those civil and social rights that come into play when citizens seek access to public goods and services.
8 Large categories of citizens, when actively negotiating the terms of their access to legally-mandated public goods with agents of the state, are systematically ignored or treated with disdain; they can face ill treatment and the threat of physical violence.
There is a substantial literature on the quality of democracy that focuses on national political institutions or national citizenship regimes (O'Donnell 1993 (O'Donnell , 1994 Diamond and Morlino 2005; Friedman and Hochstetler 2002; Yashar 2005) . Examining the quality of democracy from the vantage point of individual citizens and their day-to-day relations with agents of the state offers a valuable and complementary view to these studies.
We draw on Somers (1993) in conceiving the strategies that active citizens use to negotiate access to public goods and services, such as institutionalized petitioning or engaging in contentious collective action, as types of citizenship practices. Somers (1993) suggests that national constitutional-legal frameworks granting citizenship are activated by local actors, who forge distinctive citizenship practices across geographic, temporal, and social space depending on local political configurations. It is these distinct "institutionally embedded social practices" of citizenship that govern relations amongst people and between them and public authorities (1993: 589) . 9 Our four types of citizenship practicesinstitutional petitioning, informal brokerage, contention, and self-provisioningapproximate the democratic ideal of citizenship to different degrees (see Table 1 ). At the time of the survey the share of the population active in participatory governance institutions in São Paulo and Mexico City (such as participatory budgeting) was very small in absolute numbers and we do not explore this form of citizenship practice. The four types of practices we examine provide not only a tool 6 The democratic rule of law entails a broad answerability for the lawfulness of "unequal action" or inaction in meeting government's duty to provide legal entitlements or conditions that allow citizens to fulfill the full array of rights (Schmitter 2004; O'Donnell 2005) . 7 Cf. Méndez et al. 1999; Diamond and Morlino 2005. 8 Recent literature on citizenship in Brazil and Mexico by-and-large focuses on the legal citizenship regimes that are supplanting the 20th century corporatist regime that bound citizens by functional groups to the state-a radical-democratic citizenship regime (with strong participation governance institutions) in Brazil (Dagnino 2007 ) and a multicultural regime providing indigenous peoples collective rights and cultural autonomy in Mexico (Lomnitz 2001) . The aspects of citizens' day-to-day relations to the state explored in Latin America are police violation of civil liberties and impunity from justice (Méndez et al. 1999; Davis 2006) . 9 Like Somers (1993) , our starting point is T.H. Marshall's notion of citizenship as full and equal membership in a political community and citizenship rights as mutually enforceable claims.
to map the varied terrain of citizenship in practice, but also a metric (albeit a very rough one) to assess the quality of citizenship.
The democratic ideal of universal rules and equal treatment suggests that individuals should have equal access to public officials. Universal rules, rather than differentiated or particularistic norms, must govern this access in order to reduce arbitrary denial of access (for example that exercised by police or guards at the entry point to a public building); these rules ensure that the cost of access-in informational, time, and skillsis not prohibitive to poorer citizens (for example by providing impartial guidance to semi-literate citizens). Under the citizenship ideal, public officials must treat citizens as legal rights-bearing agents who are entitled to information on public decisions related to their interests, to petition public officials, and to appeal decisions made by those officials. In a complex modern society where impersonal social relations prevail, these principles tend to be met by formal and institutionalized channels. Institutionalized petitioning-that is, petitioning state agents directly (without the mediation of associations or brokers) through institutionalized channels that guarantee universal access and equal treatment under the law-is the practice that most closely approximates the democratic ideal.
Informal brokerage can be an effective means of obtaining public goods for the urban poor, immigrant groups, and other less powerful or subaltern groups. From the standpoint of democratic citizenship, however, the resort to brokers suggests individuals are not rights-bearing agents and/or do not enjoy equal treatment under the rule of law. In the exchange between clients and brokers, the clients lose some of their legally guaranteed autonomy. In cases of clientelist brokerage, a particularly • Citizens make direct claims on public bureaucracy through channels that are known, formal, and universally accessible.
• Requires simple and knowable administrative procedures; equal and fair treatment; and channels for appeals or complaints.
Informal brokerage
• The intervention of a more powerful third party to obtain access to public officials or obtain some form of government response.
• Involves an asymmetry in power, and clients trade away some of their right to obtain access to vital goods.
Contentious collective action
• Collective mobilization to apply public pressure on government outside of normal institutional channels.
• Individuals are aware of their entitlements as citizens but trade away some civil protections that come with institutional petitioning, suggesting a lack of access to or responsiveness from agents of the state Collective self-provisioning
• Forms of community self-help in which groups of people mobilize their social networks to provision basic public goods without recourse to the state.
• Disengagement from the state, likely where the state lacks the ability to respond to institutional petitioning, or there is little or no access or responsiveness from agents of the state.
common form of brokerage in Third Wave democracies, political rights are "traded away" to obtain access to public goods, such as social benefits or urban infrastructure (Fox 1994: 153) . Brokerage can involve more subtle constituency services by elected officials that are not necessarily clientelist in nature.
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The form of contentious collective action on which we focus here is citizen mobilization used to hold government accountable for its duty to provide goods that are existing legal entitlements, in a manner consistent with the rule of law. This differs subtly from contention that aims to create new rights or expand existing rights to new groups (Tilly 1986; McAdam et al. 2001) . It requires a number of favorable conditions: a social or organizational network to coordinate activity, and a political environment in which political repression is not pervasive.
11 The types of act that make up contentious activity are often more costly or risky to individuals than those related to institutional activity because they tend to require larger numbers of people, creating coordination costs, and may lack the legal protections that formal and institutionalized channels offer, hence risking repression. Again, when it comes to making existing rights effective and accessing the required public goods, this injures the principle of equality and universality that is central to democratic citizenship.
Collective self-provisioning represents a form of horizontal citizenship practice, like that found in contentious collective action, but it does not target the state. It does nonetheless occur within a local public sphere that is at least nominally regulated by the state. Common instances in São Paulo and Mexico City include arranging for garbage collection, sewerage, and security.
For the reasons given above, collective self-provisioning and the other citizenship practices should not be confused with associational participation. They are categorically different. Citizens can seek out leaders of associations as informal brokers, or ask such leaders to accompany them to government offices in support of institutional petitioning. We find no cases of association leaders being sought out as brokers. Only a very small share of the cases of collective self-provisioning and of institutional petitioning is undertaken with the help of associations.
12 Most selfprovisioning is undertaken through informal social networks made up of family or acquaintances. 10 For example, voters seek the intervention of their congressmen to expedite requests for zoning or commercial licenses, or to arrange meetings with the relevant decision-making authorities. The brokerage in this case does not require the individual to give up a political right, and is therefore less costly to the individual and less injurious to the quality of citizenship. 11 There is voluminous literature on the conditions and processes likely to lead to contentious collective action, such as protest activity and social movements, but see Tilly 1978 and Melucci 1996; Tarrow 1998; McAdam 1999; McAdam et al. 1996 McAdam et al. , 2001 In Mexico City, where collective self-provisioning is high, 10% of such activity reported was organized through a local association (88% of the reported activity was undertaken with family and acquintances, without the involvement of an association). Of the people in São Paulo and Mexico City who engaged in institutional petitioning, 10% and 9% respectively reported having had the support of associations, though in many instances these were not associations in which they reported participation. Of the people who petitioned the state in São Paulo, 57% did so alone and 33% with family or acquaintances; Mexico City has the reverse pattern, with 38% alone and 52% with family or acquaintances.
Associationalism, class, and active citizenship
Comparative historical studies provide us with valuable conceptual tools but they have little to say about the impact of associational participation on active citizenship or its practices. Research in this tradition is largely focused on national-level citizenship regimes and large collective agents such as labor or indigenous movements, rather than on individuals and their everyday relations to the state. The large literature on civic engagement, however, has since the 1960s used survey research in North America and Europe to explore a variety of forms of civic or political activism and offers two important hypotheses about the relationship between associationalism and active citizenship that we explore here.
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The first is often treated as an assumption in the literature but is in fact a hypothesis: participation in associational life makes individual citizens more publicspirited and capable of engaging in public politics. Studies argue that associations help socialize individuals into civic values, inculcate democratic habits, and teach civic skills that enable one to take part in democratic public life (Almond and Verba 1963: chapter 10; Putnam 2000: 338-9; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993: 12-16; Dalton 2006 ).
An important extension of this idea is that citizens' public-spirited engagement improves the quality of democratic institutions. Putnam (2000: chapter 21) , for example, is explicit in linking the quality of democratic institutions to the civic engagement of individual citizens. The causal claim in this instance is more ambiguous but has two parts. First, citizens acquire a sense of their agency, a publicspiritedness, important democratic habits, and basic civic skills from their associationalism, which leads them to expect and demand a particular form of treatment from agents of the state and good state performance in general. As public officials respond to these expectations and demands there is a move to what we call higher quality citizenship (Putnam 2000: 338-9, 346) . Second, when citizens join associations "their individual and … quiet voices multiply and are amplified" (Putnam 2000: 338) . To the extent that associations engage in pluralist politics to demand that public officials treat citizens as rights carriers and equals under the law, and counter any systemic bias in the provision of public goods and services, this representation also improves the quality of citizenship.
We focus primarily on the first of the two mechanisms-active citizenship (rather than on associational representation), but neither of the two mechanisms has received systematic and rigorous exploration. The notable exception is Verba et al. (1995) who develop a model that suggests that citizenship activity requires the possession of a combination of time, money, and civic skills. These are acquired through family, schools, workplaces, churches, or in voluntary associations. For individuals whose family, school, or workplace experiences were 13 Under civic engagement we included survey research on political participation, such as that by Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) . Civic engagement in this literature is usually defined very broadly as "activity that is intended to or has the consequence of affecting, either directly or indirectly, government action," which includes, alongside electoral-partisan activity, any "informal activity in local communities, contacts with public officials … and service on local governing bodies such as schools or zoning boards" (Verba et al. 1995: 9). unfavorable to the acquisition of these resources, participation in churches or voluntary associations can act as an alternative path to the acquisition of civic skills. The authors provide convincing evidence that associational participation increases different forms of civic engagement and helps individuals caught at the bottom end of the class and gender stratification to "catch up" with their more privileged counterparts in factors supporting active citizenship.
The civic engagement literature tends to conflate level (and socio-demographic distribution) of engagement with the quality of democracy. In the case of active citizenship, we expressly link distinct practices of citizenship (to negotiate access to public goods and services) to the quality of democratic citizenship. In the analysis that follows, we examine separately the level and quality of active citizenship. Civic engagement nonetheless provides a second hypothesis that we examine. It highlights a powerful link between socio-economic status-generally defined in terms of class (income/education and labor market status), gender, and ethnicity/race-and different forms of civic engagement. Among the most consistent empirical regularities in survey research conducted in affluent democracies is that those individuals who have less education and income, have more precarious labor market insertion, and/or are women, are less likely to participate in associational life and are less likely to be active citizens (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Dalton 2006) . Political economy studies of Latin American democracy, a separate literature, further suggest that people who work in "informality" experience a diminished form of citizenship and are less likely to be active. Outsourcing or the informalization of labor relations during the 1990s is said to have led to a decline in union membership and a general fall in political engagement, or in some instances the rise of new populisms (Roberts 2002; O'Donnell 1994) . Verba et al. (1995: 25) and other scholars in the civic engagement tradition suggest that their findings can nonetheless be generalized beyond the United States and Europe, including to younger and less-affluent democracies. There is no reason to assume, however, that positive associational effects observed in a number of affluent democracies occur in the different context of less affluent Third Wave democracies and at different historical moments. The political-institutional terrain in Latin America discussed above, for example, differs substantially from those in older, affluent democracies (ignoring here important variation within this latter universe).
There is little systematic comparative research on associational life in Third Wave democracies (excepting on organized labor), but initial research on urban Brazil, Mexico, and India, reveals significant differences with affluent democracies (Gurza Lavalle et al. 2005; Houtzager and Gurza Lavalle 2010; Harriss 2005; Narayanan 2005 ).
14 For example, voluntary membership is sine qua non with civil society or the associational sphere in affluent democracies, 15 yet it is not a common feature of community (non-workplace) associations of the working classes and urban poor in urban Brazil, Mexico, and India. In the urban centers of these countries, neighborhood associations and small community groups, networks of urban movements, advocacy and urban development NGOs, and non-profit service providers, define their role as acting with or for a particular community or target population. While they overwhelmingly have some formal organization, and most associations are registered with at least a notary public, leaders are often not elected, or are elected by "the community" in open assemblies, and accountability is generally diffuse and informal (Gurza Lavalle et al. 2005; Houtzager and Gurza Lavalle 2010) .
Will participation in these types of associations have a similar impact on active citizenship as participation in the "classic" membership organizations? It is certainly possible, as the face-to-face interaction through which hypothesized effects of associational participation on active citizenship occurs, making possible the acquisition of Tocquevillian "knowledge of how to combine" and other civic skills, as well as the development of collective interests or identities (Putnam 2000: 58; Skocpol 1999: 498-504) , is certainly present. Yet this face-to-face interaction in North American associations is shaped by the fact that its protagonists are "members" in the association, are (at least formally) equal parties, commonly elect their leaders, and can themselves become leaders. This is not the case in most civil associations in São Paulo or Mexico City.
From concepts to measurement
We explore whether individuals who participate in associations are more likely to negotiate access to basic public goods and services, and whether they are more likely to do so through institutionalized petitioning. We further explore whether the impact of associational participation is greater for individuals caught at the lower end of class and gender hierarchies.
Active citizenship
Active citizenship is any attempt to hold agents of the state-i.e., public bureaucracy-directly accountable for meeting legal obligations to provision mandated public goods and services. This includes activities that are "statecentric," in that they attempt to obtain access to goods and services by making claims on the state, through forms of institutionalized petition, informal brokerage, or contentious collective action. It also includes "community-centric" efforts to collectively self-provision such goods without government involvement, such as participating in a neighborhood watch-a collective decision and solution, to increase one's security-or contributing to the excavation of sewage ditches with labor or materials.
16 It does not include private solutions, such as individual market-based or self-provisioning solutions, e.g., attempting to increase one's personal security by purchasing a gun. It also does not include electoral-partisan activities.
Active citizenship, unlike civic engagement, also does not include participation in associations or clubs, as negotiating the terms of access to legallymandated public goods and services is categorically different from associational participation. Active citizens can, for example, pressure civil associations to provide basic services, though we find that this is extremely rare in São Paulo and Mexico City.
The relationship between associational participation and active citizenship may differ according to whether a person has participated in a neighborhood or community association at some point in time during their life, in the last 5 years, or currently participates. In the case of the three central concepts-active citizenship, citizenship practices, and participation in associational life-we used a 5-year recall period.
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The survey measure of active citizenship was constructed in the following manner. The Citizen Survey first asked about respondents' salience of problems in several issue domains: public order/security, healthcare, air pollution, basic urban infrastructure and services, and basic needs such as housing and food. Then it asked whether respondents believed government had the primary responsibility for addressing problems in these issue domains. Finally, the survey asked respondents seven questions about different types of acts they might have undertaken to address problems in these or related domains. We asked: "In the last 5 years have you [(a) approached the government] to try to address problems like those on the card?" This question was repeated using: (b) brought a legal case; (c) sought the assistance of political parties; (d) sought the assistance of an influential person; (e) participated in a demonstration or other public act; (f) organized with others to self-provision a solution. 18 A final, open question (g) asked respondents if there was any other activity that they had undertaken. This final question found that "signing a petition" was a common act.
19
Active citizenship is therefore operationalized as undertaking any combination of the above acts in the 5 years prior to the survey, in order to influence public decision-making at the civil level, in the five issue domains and related issue areas. The typology of citizenship practices is operationalized by aggregating the set of questions above (a-g) in a different way. Three of the practices in the typology are 'state-centric,' while the fourth abandons the state to make a claim on a community or other collectivity.
Institutional petitioning (IP) was measured by combining (a) the act of seeking out government officials in person and (b) bringing a legal case to force some form of government action. Citizens overwhelmingly sought out government officials in person, however, visiting the relevant offices, making telephone calls, or sending in correspondence. The number of instances in which judicial institutions were used is very small.
Informal brokerage is measured by (c) seeking out political parties and/or (d) seeking out an influential person to intercede on one's behalf. Individuals can also seek out leaders of associations, in which they may or may not participate. Empirically, we find very few cases of association leaders being sought out as brokers. Instances where individuals seek out associations for their role as direct providers of particular goods, rather than for their role as brokers, qualify as forms of collective self-provisioning.
Contentious collective action is measured by (e) participation in activities such as public demonstrations or acts and (f) signing petitions to pressure public officials.
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Collective self-provisioning is measured by a single question, (g) organizing with others to self-provision a solution.
Combining citizenship practices is costly in informational terms and in time but it is common in the two cities. Citizens are likely to have a single type of citizen practice where there is an effective and well-institutionalized channel for accessing public officials and acquiring mandated goods. 21 They engage in a mix of practices, making multiple bets, when there is low certainty that institutional petitioning, or any other single practice, will be effective. We create a variable called Mixed citizen practices that is measured by any combination of the four ideal type citizenship practices. The combinations of practices, we find below, differ significantly between São Paulo and Mexico City.
Associationalism in the community and workplace
Formal membership is used as a proxy for associational participation by convention in survey research but our variable Associational Participation is defined somewhat differently. 22 Our variable seeks to capture the form of 'participation' in which the hypothesized associational effects on citizenship occurs-that is, face-to-face interaction between participants. Depending on the type of association and research context, formal membership may or may not coincide with this form of face-to-face interaction. "Community" and "Workplace" associations in Brazil and Mexico have different types of relation to their respective publics and we therefore use analytic equivalents to capture this faceto-face interaction in the two. 23 20 We do not distinguish between organizing and participating in these activities. 21 The authors thank Adrian Gurza Lavalle for this insight. 22 The World Values Survey (2005), for example, asks respondents if they are "active members," "inactive members," or "not members," and Verba et al. (1995: 542-549) use"'member of ..."' In Brazil the 2000 Demographic Census (IBGE 1996 (IBGE , 2001 and São Paulo state's Well-Being study (SEADE 1998) use formal membership. Mexico's Federal Electoral Institute's (IFI) "Encuesta Nacional sobra Cultura Política y Practicas Cuidadanas 2003" uses a definition similar to ours, "participation in …," but unfortunately does not specify a time period (INEGI 2003) . 23 Analytic equivalents are distinct empirical phenomena that nonetheless fulfil the same analytic function in a model, cf. Przeworski and Teune 1966; and Locke and Thelen 1995 . Studies of associational life make a variety of other distinctions between associations, cf. Fung 2003. For community associations such as neighborhood associations, cultural groups, some types of public interest organizations, and church groups, the analytically correct focus is "participation"' rather than formal membership. By "participation" we mean ongoing involvement in the association and its activities. We use a simple set of dichotomous variables for measuring participation in these different types of associations, rather than membership. The variable Community association is defined as any participation in cultural, neighborhood, and ethnic or issue-based associations over the 5 years prior to the survey. While we use a dichotomous variable, we do report the average number of "acts of participation" a month that respondents had in the different types of associations.
In contrast, formal membership is the norm for unions, professional associations, and even in associations that represent workers in informal employment (see definition p. 15). The type of face-to-face interaction members of workplace associations enjoy occurs both at work and at association activities. Under Brazilian and Mexican labor legislation, all workers in a unionized workplace are automatically union members. Because of this, the casual face-to-face interaction between association members that we are looking for takes place both during specific association meetings, events, and activities, and in an ongoing and continual manner in the workplace itself.
Religious organizations in Brazil and Mexico, two overwhelmingly Catholic countries, are also not organized around the idea of formal membership. But in this case the analysis faces a distinct challenge. The share of the population that attends church regularly is high: over 65% in the two cities. The variable therefore lacks sufficient variation to be useful in the subsequent multivariate analysis. Furthermore, descriptive statistics suggest that there is no significant variation in active citizenship between Catholics and non-Catholics. 24 For these reasons our analysis focuses on secular associational activity.
We measure Associational participation by asking two questions: "Do you currently participate in any [neighborhood associations]? In the last 5 years have you participated in any [(a) neighborhood associations]?" This question is repeated for (b) cultural/sporting groups, (c) any type of cooperative, or (d) women's group or ethnic, regional, minority group or association (for example, an association of black people or of Italian or Japanese origin), (e) trade union or professional representation, (f) religious group, church, or mosque, and (g) any group, movement or association that we have not yet mentioned. For reasons given immediately above, the variable Associational participation is measured by a 24 Religious groups' lack of impact on active citizenship in Brazil and Mexico likely reflects differences between Catholicism and U.S. Protestantism. The "Catholic Puzzle"-high Church involvement, teachings that emphasize participation in community life, but low levels of civic activity-appears related to structural features of the Catholic Church (Bane 2005) . Verba et al. (1995: 245, 381) argue that, in the United States, the large size of Catholic parishes, limited opportunities for lay participation in liturgical activities, and hierarchical organization mean that Catholic church-goers have fewer opportunities to acquire public skills than their Protestant counterparts. The structure of the Catholic Church in Latin America is, if anything, more hierarchical, and São Paulo and Mexico City parishes tend to have particularly large congregations. Putnam (1993) makes a similar argument for Italy.
positive response to any of the questions except (h) religious groups, church, or mosque.
Class, gender, and other explanatory factors Defining and measuring class has an entire literature of its own, but here we simplify a complex discussion to focus on where virtually all definitions of class start-that is, with some combination of education and income levels, along with labor market insertion. To capture class we primarily use educational attainment, rather than income, because reliable income data is difficult to collect, particularly at the household level (Deaton 1997) , and household income and education are, as expected, statistically correlated in the cities, and particularly in São Paulo. Studies also consistently show that political engagement of diverse forms, and in both affluent Western democracies and middle or low-income democracies, is particularly sensitive to education (Putnam 2000: 186-187; Krishna 2006; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba et al. 1995) . For pragmatic reasons our definitions of these variables are slightly different in the two cities. In São Paulo we distinguish between people with Primary education or Less, Secondary, and Higher education. In Mexico City there is no statistically significant variation across primary and secondary education for active citizenship. We therefore simplify the model for Mexico City by using the variable Higher education and Not higher education.
25
Labor market status is a central component of class and we explore several of its dimensions. We define variables for people who are In the labor market as either working or unemployed but looking for work, and those who are Outside the labor market as people who are not working and not looking for work, such as full-time homemakers, students, and retirees. The commonly held idea that workers are either in "the" formal or informal sector in Latin America is a poor guide to research. Formal and informal labor relations can co-exist in the same workplace and some aspects of a workplace can be formal, sanctioned by the required government licenses or permits for example, while others are informal. For this and other reasons we use a simple juridical definition to capture who works in relative formality and informality: Formal work relations (in the private sector) involve legal employment contracts, Informal work relations exist in the absence of such contracts, and Public sector work relations are those in which the contractor is government. People who work for remuneration are 'informal' if: (a) they are employees and do not have a formal employment contract; (b) are independents (autonomo) who work without employment relations and do not contribute to national social insurance (hence are not liberal professionals); or (c) have micro-enterprises with five or fewer employees, do not contribute to national social insurance, and do not have formal contracts with any of their employees. 26 25 We use dichotomous, rather than continuous, education variables because the years of educational attainment are strongly clustered around final year of primary, secondary, and higher education. These markers provide convenient definitions of the education component of class. Therefore we use variables for each of the three education categories. Because the share of the population with no years of formal schooling is below 4%, we include this stratum in the category Primary education or less. 26 This definition is for the principal work, and similar to that used by CEPAL and the ILO (Comin 2003 ).
The gender variable is self-explanatory as we use what amounts to a dichotomous variable (woman/man). We also test a small number of additional variables that other studies have shown may influence either active citizenship or associational participation in our two research contexts. In Brazil this includes race. Racial categories in Brazil are extremely complex and contested, and we use the simplest possible distinctions-white, black, mixed, and other. Religion is a factor widely examined in Latin America and elsewhere. In Mexico City the overwhelming majority of the population is Catholic and this variable was only used in São Paulo. We used Catholic, Protestant, and Other. Protestant includes both traditional churches such as Lutheran and Presbyterian, and newer evangelical churches such as the Assembly of God and the Universal Church. Finally, we also test a territorial variable to control for possible neighborhood effects. In São Paulo the dummy variable is defined in terms of the city's 96 administrative districts. In Mexico City we used the city's 17 administrative delegaciones. We do not test for the impact of formality/informality of residences: a large share of the population in both cities live in housing that lacks legal title but initial descriptive statistics show no evidence of a relationship between residential status and citizenship.
One survey, two most likely cases
The Citizen Survey on which this paper is based is of the adult population and was conducted in 2002/03 in the metropolises of São Paulo and Mexico City. The interviews were conducted in person and included batteries of questions about problem-salience and problem-solving strategies, political participation and knowledge, associational participation, work history and labor market insertion, and demographic and household information. The questionnaire and sampling method used in the cities were the same, with relatively minor adjustments to account for contextual specificities, such as the terms used for political brokers (a "big gun" in São Paulo-pistolão-and a "lever" in Mexico City-palanca). The survey has a stratified random sample of adult (18 years of age or older) within municipal boundaries of São Paulo (N=1,292; population 10.7 million) and the Federal District of Mexico City (N=1,285; population 8.5 million). 27 The sample size is large: many national-level surveys in Brazil and Mexico have a similar number of observations. São Paulo and Mexico City are located in middle-income countries that differ substantially from the affluent industrial democracies in which most existing research has been conducted. Notwithstanding important differences between the two, they are most likely cases-that is, the factors that are believed to influence an impact of associational participation on active citizenship are strongly present. If the generalizations based on the experience of affluent democracies do not hold in these cases they will be powerfully undermined (George and Bennett 2005: 120-121) . The cities are located in countries that experienced democratic transitions in the last 25 years; share the legacies of authoritarian rule, political clientelism, and high levels of social inequality associated with diminished forms of citizenship, and have up until recently had associational spheres dominated by corporatist associations under high levels of state control. Over the past two-and-a-half decades, however, they have seen the emergence of competitive democratic institutions and vigorous and pluralist associational spheres.
We selected sub-national rather than national regimes in Brazil and Mexico because large new democracies such as these characteristically have sharp regional variation in government presence and political institutions. Whereas the sub-national regimes represented by São Paulo and Mexico City today have the kind of substantial government presence and competitive electoral arena that is considered a virtual prerequisite for the possibility of high quality citizenship, this is not true of many regions of the two countries and of rural areas in particular. 28 In the context of such regional variation national-level data can mask important causal relations because these can average out high variations in the values of important explanatory variables. This is a particularly significant concern in countries where enclaves of the authoritarian clientelism associated with "low intensity democracy" coexists with regions where government does far better at enforcing civil or political rights and producing public goods for their realization (O'Donnell 1993; Fox 1994; Foweraker and Landman 1997) . Sub-national units such as large urban centers constitute a universe with a higher degree of internal homogeneity than national units and reduce this heterogeneity problem (Snyder 2001) .
Active citizenship varies, but not its relation to associationalism
We now present an initial portrait of citizenship activity and associational life in the two cities. São Paulo and Mexico City differ significantly in the level of active citizenship and types of citizenship practices. The levels of associational participation are similar in the two cities at approximately a third of the population, but as we shall see shortly, not in the form it takes. This variation is analytically important. We can examine whether these differences in citizenship are related to, and potentially produced by, variation in associational participation, or perhaps other individual-level characteristics (education, party affiliation, and so forth). An initial analysis (not presented here) showed that political factors, such as party membership or voting behavior, do not have a strong relationship to active citizenship or associational participation in either city. These are therefore not discussed in this article. Table 2 summarizes the major variables that are discussed below.
Active citizenship in São Paulo is highly concentrated among the better off, yet the dominant practice of citizenship across social groups is institutionalized petitioning (see Tables 2 and 3 ). In contrast, in Mexico City active citizenship is relatively equal, but the state has lost its centrality to the practices of citizenship as collective self-provisioning is the most common and mixed practices are disproportionately high. Contentious collective action is common in São Paulo but not in Mexico City, while informal brokerage is rare in both cities. 29 Active citizens in São Paulo make up 37% of the population and 57% in Mexico City (Table 2) . 30 The difference reflects in large measure the high level of inequality in active citizenship in São Paulo: it is heavily concentrated among the better off (Table 3) . For example, the share of people with higher levels of education being active citizens 31 is more than twice the share for those with lower-levels of education. In São Paulo citizenship at the civil level therefore appears to be highly unequal but the same practices are deployed across the social groups.
The single largest category of citizenship practice in Table 2 is mixed for both cities, but in the case of São Paulo the mix of practices is virtually entirely state-centric: 29 The share of the population with brokered practices is similar in the two cities and surprisingly low given the characterization of politics found in the literature on Latin America. Only part of the discrepancies between our findings and accounts in the literature can be explained by our choice of cases-the largest urban centers rather than national political systems-and by some under-reporting. 30 These are weighted values from the sample population, we use population for short. 31 Dependent variables are italicised. We will italicize active citizen or active citizenship in most contexts below. Women 57 57.5 *A small share of the population participates in both community and workplace associations, hence the numbers add up to slightly more than the total Associational Participation institutionalized petitioning is combined with contention and/or, less often brokerage. As a singular practice, the dominant category is institutional petitioning. In contrast, in Mexico City active citizens are distributed far more equally across the population than in São Paulo: for example, the share of people with higher levels of education who are active citizens exceeds by only 25% the share of those with lowerlevels of education. The dominant form of singular citizenship practice, however, is collective self-provision. Almost half of the population has a mix of practices that include self-provisioning. The high level of mixed practices in Mexico City suggests that, in order to gain access to mandated public goods and services, individuals cannot simply petition public bureaucracies but instead have to rely on multiple types of citizenship practices, and ultimately have to organize collectively to self-provision many of these goods and services. Both the high level of mixed and collective selfprovisioning suggests that the state has lost some of its centrality to citizens. This is true not just of the less well-off, but for all social strata.
The different patterns in São Paulo and Mexico City are striking because the cities' populations have broadly similar problem salience across the issue areas investigated and, with a few important exceptions, overwhelmingly attribute primary responsibility for these issue areas to government. 32 For example, in both cities over 75% of the population holds government as primarily responsible for urban services such as public transportation and sewerage, and over 80% for basic medical care. Furthermore, the range of issues that citizens seek to address is broadly similar in the two cities: primary urban services such as drainage, garbage collection, or public illumination; secondary urban goods such as public parks and leisure areas; public order or security; housing; and to a lesser extent problems related to access or billing of public utilities. 32 The issue area where there is significant difference between the cities is Basic Needs: 78% of the São Paulo sample but only 48% of the Mexico City sample said government had primary responsibility for helping meet basic needs such as food, clothing and housing. The level of participation in secular associations in the two cities is a little over a third of the population (Table 2) . 33 There is an important difference in the associations in which people participate: in São Paulo participation in community and workplace organizations is close to 18% in each instance, whereas in Mexico City 25% of the population participated in community associations but only 9% in workplace organizations. In each city only a very small group participates in both workplace and community associations. The difference in the type of associations in which people participate raises the possibility that the distinct citizenship patterns in the cities are related to their respective patterns of associationalism. Perhaps the high level of participation in community associations in Mexico City contributes to higher levels of collective self-provisioning? Or workplace organizations such as unions lead their members to institutionalized petitioning? Neither appears to be the case, however, as we see below.
Is there a single pattern in the relationship between associationalism and active citizenship across the two cities? Table 3 leaves little doubt that there is a strong pattern across the cities. 34 In both, individuals who participate in associations have substantially higher levels of active citizenship than their counterparts who do not. In São Paulo, 57% of people who participate in associations are active, more than double the 27% of those who do not participate and are active; in Mexico City the difference is smaller but still large, 79% and 48% respectively. The correlation between associationalism and citizenship activity is therefore particularly strong in São Paulo and still substantial in Mexico City.
The relation associationalism has to citizenship activity should be seen in light of the other factors that might influence such activity. Socio-economic characteristics are widely found to have an impact on citizenship activity in affluent democracies and we therefore examine the proportion of people who are active by certain socioeconomic features. For each of the categories in Table 3 , associationalism is correlated with higher levels of activity; the table shows active citizenship in the general population in comparison to active citizenship with associational participation. In São Paulo, 37% of the general population is active; among the population with associational participation it is 57%. Among the non-participants of lower socio-economic status (those not in the labor market or with low level of education) only a small share are active citizens; the share is significantly higher, however, among individuals with associationalism. The degree to which associationalism is associated with citizenship activity is proportionally higher for the lower classes than it is for other groups in São Paulo, as well as in Mexico City.
Associationalism in Mexico City has a less striking relationship to citizenship activity; the city's overall level of active citizenship is high. Table 3 shows that for 34 The shares of the population in the two cities that participate in associations and are active citizens are 17% in São Paulo and 24.4% in Mexico City. The higher percentage in Mexico City reflects the larger share of the population that is active in that city. 33 Our definition of associationalism casts a wider net than those using current and formal membership, and the values we report lie at the higher end of those reported in other studies. Current participation was 22% and 21% in São Paulo and Mexico City, respectively. The intensity of participation in community associations is similar in the cities: from on average 3 times a month in the activities of neighborhood associations-such as meetings or events-to twice a week in cultural or leisure associations. Participation in workplace associations is less intense: 0.5 and 1.5 times a month, in São Paulo and Mexico City respectively. Mexico City, in the general population 57% engage in active citizenship; the corresponding figure for those with associational participation is 79%. The most striking increase in active citizenship associated with associationalism occurs among women and those outside of the labor market.
Associational participation leads to a similar increase in active citizenship for workers in formal and informal employment. This is true despite differences in the type of associations in which they participate: in both cities informal workers have higher participation in community associations, whereas formal workers have higher participation rates in workplace associations (though in Mexico City formal workers also have relatively high participation in community associations).
We explore in the following section how these factors interact to influence citizen activity. We now turn to provide an account of different types of citizenship activity we find in the two cities and its relationship with associationalism.
Associationalism reinforces existing practices of citizenship
So far there is no evidence that associational participation may improve the quality of citizenship practice, in particular that it may be associated with institutional petitioning. Table 4 shows the type of citizenship practices we find in the two cities. It suggests in fact that people with associational participation have similar types of citizenship practices to the general population in their respective cities. Associationalism is related to higher levels of active citizenship overall but not to any particular types of citizenship practice. This is true for people in the lower social strata as well.
In the case of São Paulo, associational participation has a strong correlation with institutionalized petitioning and mixed practices consistent with the fact that associational participants are more likely to be active citizens than those without associational participation. The likelihood of petitioning the state through institutionalized channels is independent of associational participation. For example, although 57% of those with associationalism are active citizens in São Paulo, only 19% of this group engages in institutional petitioning.
35 Associationalism has almost no relation to collective self-provisioning, which is an uncommon citizenship practice overall (see Table 4 ). There is, however, a strong correlation with contentious practices: 10% of people with associational participation engage in contention, whereas only 4% of those without do so.
In Mexico City there is a very strong correlation between mixed citizenship practices and associationalism, and a weak correlation to self-provisioning. In contrast to São Paulo, there is no correlation to institutionalized petitioning and the relation to contention is weak with the absolute numbers being too small to make any strong claims. In general associationalism therefore is related to higher levels of the dominant pattern of citizenship practices in Mexico City, rather than to any change in that pattern. However, those with associational participation tend to have mixed citizenship practices more than those without; this difference, although statistically significant, is not pronounced.
Associationalism in both cities appears to reinforce the existing citizenship practices and, irrespective of class or gender positions, fails to improve or otherwise alter them. This is true despite the differences in associational participationcommunity versus workplace associations-in the two cities. In particular, it does not appear to increase institutionalized petitioning, the citizenship practice that most approximates the democratic ideal.
Associations and education in the multivariate models
The descriptive portrait above shows that people who participate in associations are more likely to be active citizens in both São Paulo and Mexico City. The portrait does not suggest, however, that associational participation has any relation to citizenship practices. The multivariate analysis in this section, through the use of probit models, 36 allows us to verify the strength of the statistical relation between associational participation and active citizenship, as well as to different practices of citizenship. We can isolate the unique statistical impact of associational participation on active citizenship, despite the correlations that may exist between this and other factors, such as education or gender. This section primarily details the statistical interpretation of the data through the construction of multivariate models that relate characteristics of individuals as determining factors to various forms of active citizenship. 36 The residuals of the estimates are roughly normal. a Mixed practices differ in the two cities in line with the differences in the frequency of Institutionalized Petitioning and Self-Provisioning. In São Paulo Mixed overwhelmingly includes the Petitioning but rarely Self-Provisioning, in Mexico City Self-Provisioning is overwhelmingly present but Petitioning much less so
We next explain what leads citizens to become active using a multivariate model. Then, because we are unable to specify strong models for any of the four citizenship practices, including for institutionalized petitioning in São Paulo and collective selfprovisioning in Mexico City, we define models for State-centric practices. This variable combines all efforts to access government, and allows us to assess whether associational participation makes it more likely that individuals attempt to pressure government to obtain access to basic public goods and services, rather than collectively self-provision these.
The models presented below are parsimonious and yet are the ones with the highest explanatory power. The construction of the model reflects the individual bivariate relations we observed in the previous section and tests hypotheses prominent in the literature. The reported variables consistently remained significant in different specifications of the models. In the case of low education in Mexico City, we use more aggregate categories than presented in the section "From concepts to measurement", after having run regressions using the original categories and finding that some of the finer distinctions were consistently not significant.
The models could suffer from endogeneity or selection bias. Endogeneity-the problem of bi-directional causation-would be present if people participate in associations for the purposes of undertaking citizenship activities. Selection bias would be present due to the possibility that some common factor(s) could affect both associational participation and active citizenship; this common factor would be absent among the non-participants. Associational participation would be merely a coincidental feature of people who are active citizens. Endogeneity and Selection bias can be detected and corrected. However, the coefficients arising from estimations that correct these problems are difficult to interpret. Furthermore, we can rule out these problems in our specifications. We rule out endogeneity using a two-stage model, and selection bias by using propensity score matching-a technique mostly used to detect the impact of singular factors such as being exposed to media campaigns or a new educational method, among other things. We therefore interpret the simple probit models. The problems of endogeneity and selection biases are discussed in the Appendix.
The models in Tables 5 and 6 show that three factors have a strong determining effect on active citizenship in São Paulo and Mexico City. Education, labor market status, and associational participation contribute to people's proclivity to become active citizens in the two cities.
37 Alongside associational participation, education, and some aspects of labor market status, a few other variables, which do not add much explanatory power, are included in the models because they are widely believed to influence citizenship activity. The religion variables, for example, are only weakly significant for active citizens in São Paulo, yet they test the hypothesis that particular religious groups contribute to making their participants active citizens. Given the predominance of religious activities in both cities-well over 50% of the population reports attending at least one religious activity a month (SEADE 1998; NEGI 2003) -it is unsurprising that religious participation cannot explain variability in active citizenship.
The multivariate analysis confirms that there is a high probability that the relationship between associational participation and active citizens in the two urban centers is strong and, as validated in the Appendix, suggests that the causal link flows from associations to active citizenship (Tables 5 and 6 ). The multivariate analysis further confirms that associationalism and socio-economic factors do not have a determining effect for any of the distinct citizenship practices in the two cities. Our inability to specify strong models for any of the four practices, including institutional petitioning in São Paulo and collective self-provisioning in Mexico City, indicates that, despite the large sample size used, the variables included in the models do not contribute to producing these practices. At best, there is only a weak relationship in the case of institutional petitioning in São Paulo. The models for São Paulo are generally stronger than the ones for Mexico City and allow us to make stronger claims for the former.
Associationalism is an important explanatory factor in São Paulo and Mexico City for State-centric practices. For São Paulo, the model for State-centric practices is in fact stronger than it is for active citizenship, and associationalism and the same set of socio-economic factors are important determinants. This finding, along with the statistically weak model for institutional petitioning, strongly indicates that while we can identify the determining factors for accessing public provisions in São Paulo, we do not find a strong explanation for the means by which citizens attempt to access mandated public goods and services. In Mexico City, the model for Statecentric practices is weaker than that for São Paulo, likely reflecting the less pervasive nature of such practices, but it is nonetheless statistically significant. The weak model for institutionalized petitioning in São Paulo does reveal that associationalism has an effect on increasing this citizenship practice. We are not able to link associational participation to self-provisioning in Mexico City, although single variable correlation analysis in the descriptive analysis (Table 4) appears to suggest that there may be a weak linkage.
Educational achievement is also highly significant in the models and contributes to being an active citizen. The results in the two cities are similar, but the positive relationship is much more striking in São Paulo than it is in Mexico City. 38 Note that the Mexican education variable in the regression analysis is different from that 38 Inclusion of income categories alters the results only when these are reduced to two categories-low and high-which makes the low income group weakly significant. There is, however, some correlation between income and educational categories. presented in the section "Active citizenship varies, but not its relation to associationalism": here it is broken down into two categories: (1) secondary and below and (2) anything higher than secondary. 39 Similar to what various studies have found in affluent industrial democracies, individuals with higher levels of education are considerably more likely to be active citizens than those with less. Education is also significant in the weaker model for institutionalized petitioning in São Paulo: those with lower education virtually do not engage in institutionalized petitioning; higher education does not seem to significantly increase such citizenship practices above that of people of the control group, who have some secondary education.
Different aspects of labor market status are significant in the two cities. In São Paulo, being inside the labor market is an important explanatory factor (Table 5 ). In Mexico City it is the type of labor relation that matters: when we control for other factors, formal employment has a negative influence and owning a business a positive one (Table 6 ). Table 4 above suggests that people with formal relations of employment are less active than those with informal relations, or other characteristics, when they do not participate in associations. While not explicitly stated in Table 6 , we did not find informal employment, which is often believed to have a negative impact on individuals' relation to government and to political life more generally, to be a significant factor in explaining lower levels of active citizenship. The impact of labor market status is in some sense surprisingly limited: in São Paulo to being inside the labor market or not, and in Mexico to having formal employment relations or owning one's own business.
The gender variable is not significant in the models and women and men in both cities have the same proclivity to be active. There is a correlation between being a woman and being outside the labor market in Mexico City. However, being outside the labor market is not significant in our models for Mexico City, and therefore the labor status variables do not appear to disguise a gender effect on active citizenship. 40 We therefore conclude there is no significant gender gap in active citizenship or in types of practices in the two cities.
The validity of the models in Tables 5 and 6 is tested in the Appendix.
The quality of democracy: associations, citizens, and institutions
In the analysis above, associationalism and education stand out as the most important factors that support active citizenship. Aspects of labor market status also matter; the findings strongly undermine the expectation that workers in informal employment relations would have significantly lower levels of activity, and also differ in their practices of citizenship. There is no evidence of such differences in São Paulo and Mexico City, two cities with significant informal employment relations. The models also solidly dismiss expectations of a significant gender gap in citizenship activity or practices in the two cities. They do confirm the expectation that associationalism has a greater impact on individuals from lower classes, and therefore reduces the gap in active citizenship between the well-educated and rich, and the less-educated and poor, and in the case of Brazil those outside the labor market. These results are particularly robust because our data is for two sub-national regimes with little internal variation in factors such as government presence; these regimes (São Paulo and Mexico City) vary in the practices of citizenship that prevail; and the sample size used for the Citizen Survey was large.
There is an important caveat however. Individuals from lower classes are considerably less likely to participate in associations than the rest of the population. For example, in São Paulo the share of individuals who have higher education and who participate in associations is three-and-a-quarter times greater than that of individuals with only primary education or less, a gap largely driven by inequalities in the participation in workplace-based organizations. 41 This class bias in associationalism has also been widely documented in India and in affluent democracies (Krishna 2006; Harriss 2005; Verba et al. 1995; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Putnam 2000) . Relatively few in the lower classes will therefore benefit from the greater impact of associationalism on active citizenship. In both cities, and in São Paulo in particular, supporting associationalism among the lower classes would nonetheless have an impact on the level of active citizenship. Reducing educational inequality is likely to increase active citizenship, as a result of both direct educational effects and through the indirect effect education has on increased associational participation.
There is on the other hand no evidence that associationalism improves (or otherwise affects) the quality of citizenship practices. Contrary to what Putnam (1993 Putnam ( , 2000 argues, we find no basis for the proposition that higher levels of participation in associations improve the quality of governance or democracy more broadly. If this proposition were correct, not only would we find higher quality practices amongst people with associationalism but also, at an aggregate level, roughly similar distributions of citizenship practices in the two cities, as they have similar levels of associational participation. We find neither. There is no shift away from collective self-provisioning, informal brokerage or contention to institutionalized petitioning as a result of associational participation in either city. It is particularly striking that there is no shift in the practices of citizenship in Mexico City, from the prevalent practice of self-provisioning (or self-provisioning combined with other practices) to contention or to institutionalized petitioning. If we examine the quality of democracy in terms of the types of relations citizens have to the state in practice, then we find that associations do not contribute to improving the quality of democracy.
Can the differences in the types of associations in which individuals participate in the two cities help explain the variation in citizenship practices? In Mexico City participation in community associations is 2.8 times higher than in workplace associations, where as in São Paulo it is equal. 42 Perhaps community associations lead citizens towards collective self-provisioning, whereas workplace associations lead towards institutional petitioning? Community associations, such as neighborhood associations and local cultural, leisure, or ethnic clubs, tend to be more inwardoriented than workplace associations such as trade unions, which have as their primary goal enforcement of labor legislation and wage agreements. In addition, community associations in Brazil and Mexico have only recently begun to experience state regulation of their activities, and at a level that is not comparable to that experienced by unions and professional associations. The state is a critical part of workplace associations' environment; this is not the case for many community associations.
The type of association, however, has no relationship to any particular citizenship practice. Table 4 shows that in Mexico City associations (mostly community associations) do not steer participants to collective self-provisioning; the impact on practices of citizenship is no different from that in São Paulo, where associational participation is split evenly between community and workplace associations. São Paulo and Mexico City are most likely cases. This finding-that associationalism has no impact on citizenship practices-is likely to hold in contexts that are less favorable than these two cities.
There are two plausible explanations for the lack of impact on citizenship practices, despite a strong impact on active citizenship itself. First, the historical construction of associational life in Brazil and Mexico differs significantly from that in the United States and parts of Europe, and it is possible that the skills, values, and resources they provide in Brazil and Mexico do not favor institutionalized petitioning or other democratic practices. Skocpol (2003: 40-43 , chapter 3), for example, carefully traces how the organizational model that civil associations adopted early on in the United States mimicked the federal representative state, which was familiar to organizers and enjoyed wide legitimacy. Membership and payment of dues, a decentralized structure, election of representatives and standing for office, a written constitution and parliamentary procedures, as well as participation and deliberation, were already widespread in U.S. civil associations in the nineteenth century. In addition, the Protestant churches in the U.S. reinforced this model, as they favored small congregations, membership, and member participation in the running of the church.
The organizational models available to civil associations in twentieth-century Brazil and Mexico were different. The modern state-the Estado Novo in Brazil and the Revolutionary State in Mexico-was highly centralized, authoritarian, and (state-) corporatist. Community and workplace associations were in many ways brokers to access state resources, and central to extensive clientelist networks, as the developmental state greatly increased the state's role in the economy and in social life more generally. The Catholic Church, which in Brazil actively supported the construction of the corporatist state but in Mexico did not, offered a model that was no less centralized and hierarchical. The left, and communist parties in particular, had its own centralized- 42 The level of social-economic inequality in the two cities around the time of the survey was similar: the HDI was 0.841 and 0.8775 in 2000 for São Paulo and Mexico City respectively. The Income Index was 0.843 and 0.902 that year. vanguard organizational model that was carried to community and workplace associations. An alternative organizational model has emerged since the 1970s as part of the political struggles for democracy and constructed in explicit juxtaposition to the early centralized, authoritarian, and often clientelist, model. Originally inspired by the Liberation Theology wing of the Catholic Church and segments of the new left, this model emphasizes autonomy from the state and political parties, community and workplace organizing, active participation and deliberation. In Brazil in particular, scholars have heralded the emergence of an "authentic" and democratic civil society. 43 An associational survey we undertook in 2002/03 in São Paulo and Mexico City calls into question some parts of this portrait but confirms that there is a significant segment of associational life, in São Paulo probably a large minority, that has broken from the earlier organizational model. More so in São Paulo than in Mexico City, the alternative model places great value on active participation and deliberation, but not on membership or payment of dues; it is strongly rights-based and therefore "state-centric."
Yet in neither city do we see significant informal brokerage by patrons, parties, or associations, nor can we link the dominant practices of institutional petitioning and self-provisioning to associationalism. This leaves us with a final possibility. Skocpol's (1992) account of US civic activity strongly suggests that associations in that country had a symbiotic relationship with that country's state: the activities of associations, and the active citizens they helped produce, reproduced rather than transformed the existing pattern of citizen-state relations. Active citizens by-andlarge did not seek to improve the quality of their relations to the state, but rather used existing practices to further their influence over specific public policies, legal entitlements, or the existing rights architecture.
The second plausible explanation, therefore, is that political institutions, which our data suggest are relatively immune to pressures from individual or small-scale collective engagement, may shape citizenship practices, rather than vice versa as Putnam and others suggest. Citizenship practices are reasonable adaptations to the possibilities of negotiating access to basic public goods. The practices reflect not only citizens' knowledge of the state's duty to act, but also the level of physical access to state agents on who claims can be made and the type of treatment differently positioned claimants receive from these agents. The nature of the challenge involved in transforming how agents of the state engage with citizens may be qualitatively different from that involved in becoming an active citizen in general. Following the civic engagement model, associations might provide the necessary skills, values, and resources to undertake a range of citizenship activities, but not those needed for the qualitatively different task of transforming the state institutions that shape citizenship practices. This is not the place to offer an alternative explanation for the differences in citizenship practices across the two cities, but schematically, comparative historical studies might focus on variation in the types of corporatist citizenship regimes Brazil and Mexico developed early in the twentieth century (Collier and Collier 1991; Yashar 2005) , and in the sequencing of marketizing and democratizing reforms in the late twentieth century. As the largest cities and industrial centers of their respective countries, São Paulo and Mexico City (which is also Mexico's political capital) were 43 On Brazil, cf. Diomo 1995; Avritzer 2002; Dagnino 2003; for Mexico, cf. Olvera 2003. crucibles for these processes. Differentiated and unequal citizenship in Brazil emerged in the 1930s out of a conservative compromise between modernizing urban elites and traditional regional oligarchies that underpinned the Estado Novo, whereas Mexico's inclusive and relatively equal citizenship was a product of a social revolution and bargaining among members of the revolutionary family. In the last quarter of the twentieth century, democratization in Brazil was early and deep, as diverse movements united around the banner of citizenship rights and the "right to have rights" and helped oust an exclusionary military dictatorship (Dagnino 2007) . The subsequent marketizing reforms came late and were relatively shallow. The reverse took place in Mexico: the soft and inclusive authoritarianism of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) ensured early and deep marketizing reforms, eroding the corporatist institutions that historically linked citizens to the state, and subsequent political reforms were late and restricted to the electoral and party systems. These differences in associational and institutional trajectories, and in citizenship formation in particular, can help account for the prevalence of an unequally distributed but democratically robust citizenship practice of institutional petitioning in São Paulo, and a far more equally distributed but diminished democratic practice of collective self-provisioning and mixed practices which prevail in Mexico City.
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Do we then suggest that associational participation makes no contribution to the quality of democratic citizenship? The evidence we present suggests only that the impact associations have on the quality of democracy does not run through their impact on the behavior or values of individual active citizens. If there is a relationship between associations and the quality of democracy, the causal chain takes a different route. It is possible for example that associationalism has important effects on the quality of democratic citizenship through the forms of large collective agency that it makes possible. Comparative historical studies of democratization have shown that associations representing large classes of people and acting at the political level have played a central role in the construction of citizenship and the realization of social and economic rights through public policy. Participation in civil associations in this case matters because it strengthens associations that struggle to democratize the political institutions that shape citizenship practice.
Conclusion
The contribution associational life makes to democratic citizenship is of enduring concern to democratic theory. This article has explored this relationship in a novel way, taking cases outside of the universe of affluent democracies where most survey research on active citizenship or civic engagement has been conducted, and focusing on the practices of citizenship that govern relations amongst citizens and with agents of the state, rather than regime-level political contestation over the substantive content of citizenship. It has focused not on political participation but on citizens' efforts to negotiate the terms of their access to basic public goods and services that are legal entitlements. For a majority of the population in many Third Wave democracies, access to these entitlements is essential to their enjoyment of the rights constitutive of contemporary citizenship, and for improving their life chances.
The analysis has moved back-and-forth between two major research traditions on democracy that for epistemological and methodological differences rarely are brought into dialogue: civic engagement and comparative historical studies of democratization. The latter offers a rich and contextually grounded basis for conceptualizing the relationship between the legal status of citizenship and the practices of citizenship. But from the commanding heights of regime-level analysis one cannot see what quality of citizenship differently positioned citizens in fact enjoy. The civic engagement literature provides in turn a carefully developed and tested set of explanations for what we call citizenship activity, and identifies a plausible causal chain that links participation in associations to citizenship activity. It, however, tends to treat the positive role of associations as a covering law, rather than as a hypothesis to be explored in specific historical contexts, and conflates the level and quality of active citizenship.
Our findings provide a significant extension of the civic engagement proposition, originally formulated and tested in affluent democracies, that associations contribute significantly to producing citizens who actively seek to negotiate their access to vital public goods and services. We of course need to qualify this extension: within the universe of Third Wave democracies, São Paulo and Mexico City are the most likely cases, because of the strong government presence, highly competitive electoral politics, and well developed associational spheres. If the findings help expand the empirical domain to which the civic engagement generalizations drawn from affluent democracies apply, they also help narrow the scope of this contribution. The quality of citizenship, identified through what we call citizenship practices, appears to be immune to the public spirited and empowered efforts of active citizens. The level and quality of active citizenship are two strongly independent dimensions.
We justify the models reported in Tables 5 and 6 by examining: (a) fixed effect due to unobserved regional heterogeneity, (b) simultaneous causality or endogeneity (c) selection biases. As we believe the results in Tables 5 and 6 are intuitive, we are interested in verifying whether we can use these results to draw conclusions about tendencies of individuals to actively exercise their citizenship in various ways.
Fixed effect model The data set from each city can be thought of as a set of information for a panel of individuals from different regions: districts in the case of São Paulo and electoral zones in case of Mexico. These districts could impose unobserved effects in a homogenous way on individual behavior within a particular region. We tested this by running a fixed effect model for the regions of the cities. Any regional effect would most likely be correlated with individual characteristics; Endogeneity We use instrumental variables that can explain associational participation and also are independent of proclivity to be an active citizen. We do not rely on theoretical justification for the chosen instrumental variables. Table 7 reports the test to justify the models in this regard for São Paulo. The standard probit entries in Table 7 (columns 1 and 2) differ from each other because the second specification has an additional variable for labor market insertion. The corresponding IV estimates are compared (column 1 with 4 and column 2 with 5) through a seemingly unrelated estimation technique available in STATA-9 (2005) as a suest command. In both specifications we note that the null hypothesis of non-endogeneity cannot be rejected. That is, endogeneity is not likely to have a significant effect. We note, however, the result is not entirely robust. For some specifications we reject the null hypotheses. Thus endogeneity cannot be completely ruled out in the case of São Paulo. Similar tests were carried for the Mexican data. Our model for associationalims is weaker than that for Brazil. For Mexico City we can rule out the possibility of endogeneity stemming from the possible dual causality of citizen activism inducing participation in associations more strongly than we can for São Paulo. We do not report these results in this version of the article. 45 Selection bias Suppose that associational participation does not contribute to active citizenship but other characteristics do contribute. Suppose further that these other characteristics, even if unobservable, are highly correlated with some observable characteristics relevant to associational participation. In that case, associational participation is irrelevant to active citizenship. Then, on average, a member from the treated group should be an active citizen in the same way as a member from the control group when both have these other observable characteristics.
To see this more clearly, one can construct two sub-groups of individuals from, respectively, the ones with associationalism and, ones without associationalism-by selecting individuals for each of the two groups that have the same characteristics with regards to a set of variables. If the two groups, distinct only in regards to associational participation, have similar rates of citizen activity then associational participation does not contribute to active citizenship. We use a method known as propensity score matching to proceed. Two groups are deemed similar in this context if they have the same proclivity to participate in associational activities, no matter if they actually had or had not participated in associations in our sample. The proclivity is based on a probit using certain characteristics following Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) . We then use standard methods to pair the control and treated groups by this proclivity (or score), (as described in Dehejia and Wahba 2002) , to obtain two sets of samples-a group that actually had associational participation and one that did not. Both have similar observed characteristics; one can conjecture that non-observed factors are similar. We can show that subsets of our population, although with sufficient statistical power, are statistically similar, differing only with respect to 45 Results are available from the authors. their associationalism. They are matched to have similar propensity to acquire assocationalism, although some may not actually have acquired associationalism.
If the matched groups with and without associationalism are equally active then the associational effect on being active is essentially very small or negligible. We next show that the two groups within our data differ in likelihood of being active, despite the fact that they have similar characteristics. The difference in being active widens when comparing the matched groups.
In Table 8 , the columns under the heading Unmatched report the proportions that are active citizens or that mobilize government in the population. The difference in proportions that make up active citizens for those with associational participation and those without is significant. This difference remains consistent throughout the two matching techniques we used. In each case the groups act differently. Thus we can confirm that there are no selection biases in associational participation influencing citizen activities. Similar results hold for Mexico City, but in Table 8 we only present the results for State-centric Practice. Again, the model for associational participation in Mexico City is weak.
No alternative models What is the result of the various tests we have run to substantiate the models reported in Tables 5 and 6 in the text? Can we assert that associational participation results in increased active citizenship of various forms? The results for the endogeneity test show that the probit models are applicable even if for some specifications endogeneity cannot be ruled out. Our tests show that we can rule out selection bias, with the reservation that we do not have a strong explanation for associational participation in the case of Mexico City.
